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X. JUDICIAL REVIEW-SCOPE
OVERTON PARK: A NEW MODE OF REVIEW AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
The Supreme Court's decision in Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe' provided the occasion for an expression of a new
judicial attitude which may, in many instances, ultimately result in a
broader role for the courts in decisions which might previously have
been thought to be solely within the area of administrative discretion.
The case concerned a dispute over the meaning of a provision in the
Department of Transportation Act-providing that no federal high-
way funds may be used in construction of highways through public
parks unless "no feasible and prudent alternative ' 2 routes exist-and
the Act's application to a particular proposed highway project. While
reversing the lower court dismissal of the environmentalists' claims
under the Act, and remanding the case to the district court because
of the record's inadequacy, the Supreme Court went on to discuss in
detail its conception of the proper mode of judicial review of adminis-
trative action, placing heavy emphasis on the precise delineation of
an agency's scope of authority. In Overton Park the Court so strictly
construed the command that no highway through a public park
should be approved that the questions of the feasibility or prudence
of particular alternatives became matters of law, leaving the adminis-
trator with what in most cases will be only one permissible decision.
Overton Park involved a city park located near the center of Mem-
phis which contained one hundred and seventy acres of forest and
various recreational facilities, including a zoo and a golf course. The
proposed route for a six-lane, high-speed expressway would have se-
vered the zoo from the rest of the park and destroyed twenty-six acres
of parkland. This route was approved in 1956 by the Bureau of Public
Roads3 and again in 1966 by the Federal Highway Administrator.
However, funding was temporarily prevented in 1966 by the passage
of the Department of Transportation Act, 4 which declares that special
1. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
2. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970). The same phrase is used in the Federal-Aid Highway Act,
23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
3. The Bureau of Public Roads, at that time a part of the Department of Commerce, has
since been transferred to the Department of Transportation, pursuant to the Department of




effort should be made by federal agencies to preserve public park and
recreation lands.5 The Act prohibits the Secretary of Transportation
from authorizing the use of federal funds for highways through public
parks of federal, state, or local significance unless (1) there is no
feasible andprudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) there
is included in any such program all possible planning to minimize
harm to any park or recreational area used for such purposes.6 While
this provision temporarily prevented distribution of federal funds for
that section of the highway designated to go through Overton Park,
federal funding was available for the remainder of the project, and the
state acquired a right-of-way on both sides of the park.7 The Secretary
finally announced, in November, 1969, federal approval for the pro-
ject, including the routing through the park.8 The announcement was
not accompanied by factual findings or other indications as to why
the Secretary believed that there were no feasible and prudent alter-
nate routes or that design changes could not be made to reduce the
harm to the park. Petitioners, private citizens as well as local and
national conservation organizations, brought suit seeking a construc-
tion halt, arguing that feasible and prudent alternatives did exist.
After their requests for a preliminary injunction were rebuffed by both
the district court 9 and the court of appeals 0 on the grounds that what
was "feasible and prudent" was a determination solely committed to
agency discretion, they sought and received Supreme Court review.
5. Id. § 1653(0.
6. Id.
7. These acquisitions were approved in 1967 shortly after the effective date of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act of 1966. 401 U.S. at 407.
8. This announcement came despite reiteration by Congress in the Federal-Aid Highway
Act, 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-44 (1970), that highway construction through public parks must be
restricted in a manner similar to that expressed in the Department of Transportation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1970).
9. 309 F. Supp. 1189 (W.D. Tenn. 1970). Petitioners alleged, inter alia, that "feasible and
prudent" alternative routes existed around Overton Park and that even if these alternatives were
found not to be "feasible and prudent," the plan approved by the Secretary did not include all
possible methods for reducing harm to the park. Id. at 1194. The district court construed the
Secretary's discretion on the matter as being broad in scope; hence its review of the Secretary's
action was necessarily limited to a determination merely of whether it was arbitrary and capri-
cious within the meaning of the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). The court granted summary judgment dismissing the action.
10. 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970). The Sixth Circuit affirmed on substantially the same
grounds as the district court, concluding, on the basis of the Secretary's litigation affidavits,
that he "was fully aware of the alternative designs and chose the one now in effect. . . .
and that he had, in fact, determined that the proposed design included "'all possible planning
to minimize harm' to the Park." Id. at 13f3.
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The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case to the district
court, considering the record to be inadequate for a determination of
whether the Secretary had acted in excess of his statutory authority
or in abuse of his discretion.11 The actual holding of the case is nar-
row, but the Court went on to describe a mode of review which,
although conventional in theory, is far-reaching as applied in this
situation. Under the Court's mode of review the questions to be faced
are whether the agency action is reviewable at all,12 whether the agency
acted within its statutory authority or jurisdiction,1" and whether the
agency acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. 4 After establish-
ing that the Secretary's decision was reviewable,15 the Court turned
its attention to the second and most significant phase of its
scheme-the determination of whether the agency was acting within
its scope of authority. 6 The Court in fact refused to make this deter-
11. 401 U.S. at 420-21.
12. Id. at 410. This depends upon whether there is "'clear and convincing evidence' of...
legislative intent" to restrict access to judicial review, Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
141 (1967), or whether the "agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 5
U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970). In neither of the pertinent acts, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1651-59 (1970), and
23 U.S.C. §§ 101-44 (1970), is there any indication that Congress meant to preclude judicial
review. Concerning the "committed to agency discretion" exception, the Court referred to the
legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicating that this exception is applica-
ble only where a statute is "drawn in such broad terms that. . . there is no law to apply." S.
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d
Sess. 212 (1946). The Court found such "law to apply" here by strictly construing the statutory
language to give the Secretary relatively little discretion.
13. See, e.g., Citizens' Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970).
In Hudson Valley it was held that the Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a dredge and fill
permit was "in excess of statutory . . . authority," since the landfill was found to fall within
the scope of the statutory definition of the terms "dike" and "causeway" in the Rivers and
Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970), and such permits could lawfully issue only after the
consent of Congress and the approval of the Secretary of Transportation had been obtained.
Id. § 403; 49 U.S.C. § 1655(g)(6)(A) (1970). See also Guenther v. Morehead, 272 F. Supp.
721 (S.D. Iowa, 1967), where the court, citing the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970), held that
a single transaction involving an alleged wrongful negotiation of a check was not a "practice"
within the purview of the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 213 (1970), and hence the
Department of Agriculture lacked jurisdiction to render a decision in the case.
14. See, e.g., NLRB v. General Stencils, Inc., 438 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1971); Udall v. Wash-
ington, Va. & Md. Coach Co., 398 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Pressentin v. Seaton, 284 F.2d
195 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Western Addition Community Org. v. Romney, 320 F. Supp. 308 (N.D.
Cal. 1969); Price v. Udall, 280 F. Supp. 293 (D. Alas. 1968), modified sub nom. Tagala v.
Gorsuch, 411 F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1969).
15. 401 U.S. at 410.
16. Id. at 415-16. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970).
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mination, considering the record to be inadequate, and remanded the
case to the district court. The Government contended that the Secre-
tary had wide discretion to determine whether there existed "feasible
and prudent" alternatives. With particular emphasis on the "pru-
dent" aspect, the Government argued that the Secretary should "en-
gage in a wide-ranging balancing of competing interests,""7 which
necessarily would involve a considerable amount of leeway. Seeing a
"plain and explicit bar to the use of federal funds for construction of
highways through parks,"' s the Court disagreed, reasoning that the
wide-ranging balancing on the part of the agency was simply not
intended by Congress in its passage of the statutes. Because construc-
tion of highways through parkland will almost always be less costly
and disruptive than other alternatives, such an approach would result
in the use of parkland in the vast majority of instances. As a conse-
quence, preservation of such land is to be given not equivalent, but
"paramount" importance."
An examination of legislative history reveals that the Court chose
a more restrictive interpretation of the phrase "feasible and pru-
dent ' 2 than was intended by the Congress. The language first ap-
peared in the Department of Transportation Act of 1966.2 The origi-
nal bill as drafted by the Department of Transportation contained no
provision concerning preservation of parklands.2 2 The Senate Com-
17. 401 U.S. at411.
18. Id. The Court admitted, however, that some very unusual situations might be exempt
from that bar.
19. The few green havens that are public parks were not to be lost unless there were
truly unusual factors present in a particular case or the cost or community disruption
resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary magnitudes. . . .[T]he Secre-
tary cannot approve the destruction of parkland unless he finds that alternative routes
present unique problems. Id. at 413.
The pertinent Acts state that "[i]t is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort
should be made to preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation
lands, wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites." 49 U.S.C. § 1653(t0 (1970); 23
U.S.C. § 138 (1970). The Court has taken the phrase "special effort" quite seriously, and in
conjunction with the "shall not approve" language of the provisions, has forged a potent
weapon designed to insure full agency consideration ofenvironmental factors. Cf Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971), where the D.C. Circuit
did much the same thing with the significantly broader policy provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
20. Department of Transportation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1970); Federal-Aid Highway
Act, 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
21. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
22. See H.R. 15963, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 112 CONG. REC. 20953 (1966).
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mittee on Government Operations inserted a provision which would
have forbidden the Secretary from approving a highway through a
park if he found that a "feasible" alternative existed.23 The House
Conference Report added the words "and prudent" to the section in
order to assure that the Secretary would have more discretion. 24
Hence in the original version of the provision in 1966 it appears that
the Secretary was given a considerable amount of leeway in his deci-
sion making. This compromise position was reaffirmed in 1968 when
an attempt was made to replace, in the pending Federal-Aid High-
way Act," the "feasible and prudent" language, copied from the De-
partment of Transportation Act, with phraseology even more ambig-
uous and discretionary.2 1 In conference, the Senate conferees suc-
cessfully opposed those provisions 2 and the language in both acts
retained the "feasible and prudent" phraseology.28 Thus the overall
intent of Congress in enacting these bills appears to rest on a middle
ground between the Senate's proposals severely limiting discretion
and the extremely flexible approach supported by the House.2 9
The effect of narrowly construing the agency's statutory authority
in Overton Park is essentially to eliminate the power of the agency to
exercise discretion whenever a decision must be made concerning the
construction of a highway through a park. Although the Secretary is
23. S. Res. 3010, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 112 CONG. REc. 24309-10 (1966).
24. CONF. REP. No. 2236, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2450. Statements were made on the floor of the House prior to the passage of the
final bill, making it clear that the section was intended only to establish guidelines for the
Secretary and not to eliminate his discretion: "[Preservation of parkland is important] but not
to the total exclusion of other considerations [which] . . . include the integrity of neighbor-
hoods, the displacement of people and businesses, and the protection of schools, and churches
and the myriad of other social and human values we find in our communities." 112 CoNG. REc.
26651 (1966) (comments of Rep. Kluczynski). "I would want the Secretary to weigh his decision
carefully, and not feel he was forced by the provision of the bill to disrupt the lives of hundreds
of human beings." Id. at 26652 (comments of Rep. Rostenkowski).
25. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101-44 (1970).
26. The amendment would have forbidden the expenditure of federal funds for construction
through a park unless:
such program or project includes all possible planning, including consideration of alter-
natives to the use of such land, to minimize any harm to such park, recreational area,
wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from such use. H.R. 17134, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 19749 (1968).
27. 114 CONG. REc. 24025-26 (1968) (comments of Sen. Young); id. at 24029 (comments
of Sen. Randolph).
28. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(0 (1970); 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970).
29. But see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 322-25 (1971) (arguing
for a discretionary interpretation).
Vol. 1972:115]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ostensibly left with the determination of what constitutes a "feasible
and prudent alternative," in most cases there is likely to be only one
permissible conclusion. Any other conclusion would be in excess of
statutory authority. The most significant aspect of the Overton Park
decision then becomes the establishment of a three-step procedure for
review which shifts the focus of judicial inquiry from a traditional
reliance upon section 706(2)(A) of the APA, permitting the court to
set aside agency action which is arbitrary and capricious,30 to a review
of the agency's scope of authority under section 706(2)(C), which
permits the court to set aside agency action outside the scope of its
statutory authority.3' The traditional scope of review under section
706(2)(A) has been very limited, with the courts giving deference to
most agency factual decisions. 32 Decisions falling under section
706(2)(C), however, have been considered to involve questions of law
and therefore to permit a much more substantial judicial scrutiny of
the agency's decisions.33 In Overton Park, for example, by construing
the "feasible and prudent" clause to be a firm legal standard limiting
the agency's authority, the Supreme Court has permitted the review-
ing court on remand to exercise almost complete control over the final
decision. The Court's method, therefore, lays the groundwork for
future substantive scrutiny of many administrative decisions hereto-
fore believed to be relegated solely to the discretion of the agency.
30. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
31. Id. § 706(2)(C).
32. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 445 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1971); Langevin v.
Chenango Court, Inc., 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971); Scanwell Labs., Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d
859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Dorothy Thomas Foundation, Inc. v. Hardin, 317 F. Supp. 1072
(W.D.N.C. 1970); West v. Dep't of Agriculture, 305 F. Supp. 1312 (N.D. Miss. 1969); 4
DAVIS § 28.16; JAFFE 182; Kaufman, Judicial Review of Agency Action: A Judge's
Unburdening, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 201 (1970); Comment, Abuse of Discretion: Administrative
Expertise vs. Judicial Surveillance, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 40 (1966). Some noted authorities have
extended this "limited scope of review" doctrine to argue that, in certain instances, agency
action is completely unreviewable. See, e.g., 4 DAVIS § 28.16; Davis, Administrative Arbitrari-
ness-A Final Word, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 814 (1966); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Func-
tional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968). But see
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (1965); Ber-
ger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 783 (1966);
Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969).
33. See, e.g., cases cited in note 13 supra. Numerous cases have found agency action to be
outside of its statutory authority, without citing specifically to § 706(2)(C). See, e.g., NLRB
v. Brown Food Store, 380 U.S. 278 (1965); Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); R.V.
McGinnis Theatres & Pay T.V., Inc. v. Video Independent Theatres, Inc., 386 F.2d 592 (10th
Cir. 1967); Salazar v. Hardin, 314 F. Supp. 1257 (D. Colo. 1970); JAFFE 181-84, 359. See
generally 4 DAVIs ch. 30, § § 30.00-.14; JAFFE 546-94.
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The Court's approach in this case does not appear on its face to
be limited to any particular class of cases. However, the environmen-
tal area has been notably characterized in recent decisions by strict
construction of statutory language,3 particularly, the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act. 35 While the Overton Park opinion cites N EPA
only in passing, 3 the decision here may well have been influenced by
the recently expressed general congressional concern for environmen-
tal matters.
The ultimate result of the decision made on the issue of the scope
of statutory authority leaves little for the third phase of the Court's
mode of review-review for any abuse of whatever discretion remains.
The Court reiterated the traditional standard for review for such
abuse, 37 declaring that the standard is narrow and stating rather gen-
erally that the Court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the agency.38 This oft-stated prohibition on substitution of
judgment at the discretionary stage is somewhat ironic here, for under
the Court's delineation of the Secretary's scope of authority and the
reviewing court's role therein, such substitution seems a distinct possif
bility, if not a probability.
The desirability of the result here, while initially attractive from
an environmental perspective, is doubtful in view of the rationale
behind the utilization of administrative agencies. Concentration of
34. E.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971);
EDF, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp.
593 (D. Colo. 1970), affd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971). But see Scenic Hudson
Preservation Conference v. FPC, - F.2d _ (2d Cir. 1971). See generally Sive, Some
Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM.
L. REv. 612 (1970); Note, Toward a Constitutionally Protected Environment, 56 VA. L. Rev.
458 (1970).
For cases involving "public interest" areas other than the environment which illustrate the
same willingness to require strict agency compliance with what are arguably discretionary policy
provisions, see, e.g., Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); EDF, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d
584 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Moss v. CAB, 430 F.2d 891 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). Courts have generally been quite ready to utilize
NEPA's policy provisions in conjunction with other statutes to establish a strict standard of
agency compliance relevant to environmental considerations. See, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d
1130, (4th Cir. 1971) (reversing district court decision that N EPA's "discretionary" provisions
were subordinate to the "mandatory" provisions of the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration). See also Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970); EDF, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs,
324 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971).
36. 401 U.S. at404 n.1.
37. See authorities cited in note 32 supra.
38. 401 U.S. at416.
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expertise in given areas should result in more informed and responsi-
ble decisions in those areas .3 To ask courts to attempt to make such
decisions on the basis of their limited knowledge vis-a-vis that of an
agency in a given area would seem to be a mistake, sacrificing expert
and informed judgment40 for an individual court's notion of desirabil-
ity in a particular instance." The ultimate result of Overton Park,
then, may be a step-up in federal court involvement in many technical
and specialized controversies, 42 with the consequent delay and loss of
efficiency in decision making.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Parker v. United States43 consti-
tutes the first major application of the Overton Park principles to
define the scope of administrative authority under other legislation
and illustrates the far-reaching consequences of the Overton Park
mode of review.4 1 In Parker the Forest Service had contracted with
Kaibab Industries for the sale of timber in the East Meadow Creek
Area of the White River National Forest as permitted by the Multiple
Use-Sustained Yield Act.45 Subsequently, plaintiffs, several conserva-
tion groups, petitioned the Forest Service to rescind the contract and
include the East Meadow Creek Area in its report to the President
and Congress on the Gore Primitive Region as required by the Wil-
derness Act.45 The Wilderness Act, passed in 1964. required the Forest
Service to study all areas which are contiguous to existing wilderness
areas and which are also suitable for wilderness classification.47 The
39. See, e.g., F. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 14-20 (1951); I
DAVIS § 1.05, at 37-39; JAFFE 25-26.
40. But see 4 DAVIs § 30.09, at 241; Sive, 70 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 34, at 626-3 1.
41. This motion of substitution of judgment was recently rejected by the Second Circuit in
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971), where the court
upheld a decision of the Commission to issue a permit for a pumped storage power plant on
the Hudson River. Dismissing petitioners' argument that different standards ought to prevail
with respect to issues concerning the environment, the court stated that "we will not allow our
personal views as to the desirability of the result reached by the Commission to influence us in
our decision." Id. at
42. Cf. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
43. 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3450 (U.S. Mar. 21, 1972).
44. Parker is also significant as the first case delineating the scope of authority of the
Secretary of Agriculture and the Forest Service under the Wilderness Act of 1964. 16
U.S.C. §§ 1131 et seq. (1970). The Act has been mentioned only in brief dicta in recent cases
concerning forest regulations and proposed road projects, See, e.g., McMichael v. United
States, 355 F.2d 283, 285 (9th Cir. 1965); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 111, 124
(D. Alas. 1971).
45. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1970). See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
46. 16U.S.C. §§ 113letseq.(1970).
47. Id. § 1133(b).
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studies are to be forwarded to the President and Congress for a deci-
sion as to whether to preserve the areas as wilderness. In Parker the
plaintiffs argued that the East Meadow Creek Area was both contig-
uous to a primitive area and suitable for wilderness classification and
that if the logging contract were performed it would be irretrievably
damaged, thus precluding the President and Congress from making
the decision prescribed in the Wilderness Act. The Forest Service
rejected the plaintiffs' petition and stated that the proposed sale would
proceed as planned. The plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court.
After making the factual determination that the area in question was
indeed "contiguous" and "suitable" for wilderness classification
within the meaning of the Wilderness Act, the court granted plaintiffs
injunctive relief.48 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, resting its decision on
the theory that the substantially objective criteria contained in the
Wilderness Act precluded approval of the sale by the Secretary of
Agriculture and the Forest Service.
The reservation and retention of some public lands in their natural
state has long been an objective.in the management of the federal
domain. 9 Prior to the enactment of the Wilderness Act of 1964,
wilderness areas under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agriculture
and the Forest Service were adminigtered under the authority of the
Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act." Administrative decisions with
respect to the suitability of an area for wilderness classification, the
need for preserving the natural state of such an area, and the relative
value of resources in the particular area were final and unreviewable. 51
The vague concept of public interest was the only limitation on agency
48. Parker v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970).
49. H.R. REP. No. 1538, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG.
&AD. NEws 3618-19.
50. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1970). This act recognized that the national forests were to be primar-
ily used for recreation, range, wildlife, timber, and watershed purposes. The classification of
such uses was entirely within the discretion of the Secretary and the Forest Service. See McMi-
chael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965); The Meaning of the Multiple Use-
Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 41 ORE. L. REV. 49, 73 (1961). See also Jones v. Freeman, 400
F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1968) (recognizing an implied power to promulgate regulations to protect
forest resources).
51. Winder, Environmental Rights for Environmental Polity, 5 SUFFOLK L. Rav. 820, 821
(1971); see McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283, 284-85 (9th Cir. 1965); West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., - F. Supp. - (N.D. W.Va. 1971);
Jones, The Role of Administrative Agencies as Instruments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L. Rhv.




discretion. 5 Recognizing that this limitation was inadequate and that,
because of undue agency orientation and responsiveness to interests
representing economic development and mass recreational uses, the
present administrative machinery was dysfunctional for preserving
such areas,5 3 Congress enacted the Wilderness Act of 1964. The pur-
pose was to provide a statutory framework requiring long-range plan-
ning in order to assure that administrative agencies would not irre-
trievably alter areas which should be preserved as wilderness.54
The statutory scheme of the Wilderness Act prescribes a proce-
dure for review of all areas of the national forests for classification
as "wilderness areas," which requires the Forest Service to make
several decisions. The issues in Parker involved the extent of the
agency's discretion in making each decision.55 The Secretary of Agri-
culture must first determine which areas are "contiguous" and "suit-
able" for classification; second, which of those areas should be stud-
52. See Rogers v. City of Mobile, 277 Ala. 261, 169 S.2d 282 (1964); Nelson v. Mobile Bay
Seafood Union, 263 Ala. 195, 82 S.2d 181 (1955); S. Doc, No. 676, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 109
(1909); Henning, The Ecology of the Political Administrative Process for Wilderness
Classification, 1 NAT. REs. J. 69 (1971); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 474-80 (1970).
53. See S. Doc. No. 676, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 109 (1909); Clagett, Informal Ac-
tion-Adjudication-Rule Making: Some Recent Developments in Federal Administrative
Law, 1971 DuKE L.J. 51 (1971); Heyman, Environmental Management of Public Lands, 58
CALIF. L. REV. 1364 (1970); Jaffe, The Administrative Agency and Environmental Control, 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 231 (1970); Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of
"Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. REV. 367 (1968); Sax, 68 MICH. L. REV.,
supra note 52.
54. See H.R. REP. No. 1538, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. &AD. NEws 3618-19; 109 CONG. REc. 5707 (1963).
55. The issue of the agency's discretion had been presented in only two cases prior to Parker
and neither dealt explicitly with the power to commit the areas in question to some use. In
McMichael v. United States, 355 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1965), a case involving vehicular trespass
within the Idaho Primitive Area, the Ninth Circuit upheld regulations banning motorized
vehicles in that area. In rejecting assertions that the choice of areas for wilderness purposes was
subject to review, the court stated that the choice of what area to preserve was an administrative
choice in which geographical and topographical considerations were germane but not reviewa-
ble. Id. at 286. Despite the apparent emphasis on the Secretary's broad discretion, the Ninth
Circuit gave no indication how broad that power was within the designation process, since the
case concerned only the maintenance of park areas and not their use-classification. Id. at 284.
In West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., - F. Supp. - (N.D.
W.Va. 1971), a case involving the construction of a road and timbering rights in a national
forest, the controversy centered on the suitability of the area for wilderness classification under
the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act, Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy
Act. The case called for broader interpretations of statutory language concerning the environ-
mental impact in the issuance of use permits, but the court limited its review to the Secretary's
failure to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act.
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ied; third, whether to recommend that they be classified as a wilder-
ness; and fourth, whether to send his recommendations to the Presi-
dent.-6 Arguably each of these decisions involves the exercise of sub-
stantial discretion on the part of the Secretary. The Parker court,
however, expressly held that the Secretary had no discretion as to the
second and fourth steps. He must study all areas meeting the require-
ments of being contiguous and suitable7 and must forward those
studies to the President and Congress.5 8 The Court also expressly held
that he did have discretion as to the third step-whether to recom-
mend the area for wilderness classification. All three determinations
are within the traditional scope of the judiciary, since they involve
primarily the interpretation of the Wilderness Act and do not involve
the court in factual determinations normally left to the agency. With
regard to the first step, the determination of what is a "contiguous"
and "suitable" area, however, the result is significantly different. The
court, applying the Overton Park mode of review, reasoned that the
Secretary had the statutory authority to approve the logging contract
only if the forest area in question was not "contiguous" to an existing
wilderness area and not "suitable" for wilderness classification. By
construing "contiguous" and "wilderness" to constitute the legal
standards framing the parameters of the Secretary's authority, the
court necessarily left itself with the task of determining which areas
came within the named definition. The court thus limited the Secre-
tary's function under the Act to the issuance of study reports and
recommendations, leaving no power to classify wilderness areas or
56. 16U.S.C. §§ 1131etseq.(1970).
57. 448 F.2d at 796.
58. Id. The court's holding that the Secretary's discretion was restricted with regard to the
second and fourth decisions appears to be accurate. Statements in the congressional reports
indicate that the Wilderness Act was intended to remove some of the Secretary's discretion
under the previously controlling Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act. Conf. Rep. No. 1829, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3631; S. REp. No. 4,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964); H.R. RaP. No. 9070, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1964). In addition,
shortly after the passage of the Wilderness Act the Forest Service promulgated regulations
which carefully delineated the Service's responsibilities under the Act, implying that the Service
itself interpreted the Act as narrowing the agency's discretion. See 448 F.2d at 797; 36 C.F.R.
251.22-.25a (1971). Further indication of an intent to limit discretion is found in the Act's
express provision that the primitive areas would be maintained as they had been under the
Multiple-Use Sustained Yield Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1132(b) (1970), implying that any decisions
to utilize the areas would be tested against a more stringent standard. See also Letter from John
Carver, Asst. Sec. of the Interior, to Hon. Wayne Aspinall, Chmn., Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Dec. 12, 1963, reprinted in 1964 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3623.
59. 448 F.2d at 797.
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permit their use in ways incompatible with their preservation and
reserving for the court the ultimate determination of what is "contig-
uous" and "suitable." Like the phrase "feasible and prudent alterna-
tive" utilized in Overton Park, the meaning of the words "contig-
uous" and "suitable" would traditionally be left to the expertise of
an administrative agency.
The conclusion reached by the Parker court was perhaps an ex-
treme one. In the sense that the Secretary of Agriculture had the
responsibility to transmit a report on wilderness areas to the Presi-
dent, it might at first glance seem logical to assume that the Secretary
should not be able to determine the President's decision in advance
as to a particular area. Nevertheless, it seems odd indeed that the
Congress would construct such a sketchy statutory scheme for the
administration of wilderness areas and yet leave no discretion to the
officials responsible, especially since in many respects the Secretary
of Agriculture will be acting as the President's delegate and adviser
when the final report is transmitted to the Congress with Presidential
recommendations. When the court looks at areas contiguous to wil-
derness areas, it seems to forget that such areas must of necessity be
contiguous to developed areas as well, and that at some point an area,
technically contiguous to a wilderness area, will be so unsuitable for
eventual wilderness classification that no sound reason exists for de-
nying development. The court rejected a contention by the Secretary
that, since a "bumper" area of contiguous territory would be retained
under the logging scheme proposed,6" the region where logging was to
take place was not "contiguous" to the wilderness area. Still, if a
rational use of "bumper" strips cannot be employed, the potential
land contiguous to wilderness areas and arguably suitable for such
classification is greatly expanded.
An examination of Overton Park and Parker reveals that by per-
haps overstating the proper role of the courts in Overton Park the
Supreme Court has created a situation with enormous potential for
abuse. The statutory scheme in Overton Park, being essentially a
command not to approve a project unless certain specific criteria were
met, was an invitation to an absolutist approach which in some cir-
cumstances may prove harmful. The Parker legislative scheme, while
not totally dissimilar to that of Overton Park, still consisted of some-
what more generalized positive duties. To the extent that congres-
60. Id. at 796.
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sional standards are interpreted to eliminate any creativity in adminis-
trative decision making, much of the rationale for using the adminis-
trative forin of governmental organization fails.

